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An Experimental Study of Settlement Delay in Pretrial Bargaining With Asymmetric Information

Sullivan, Sean Patrick
Format
Thesis/Dissertation; Online
Author
Sullivan, Sean Patrick
Advisor
O’Connell, Jeffrey
Larson, Nathan
Pepper, John
Holt, Charles
Abstract
In the United States legal system, tort disputes often exhibit protracted delay between injury and settlement. That is, parties to a dispute tend to agree on settlement conditions only after engaging in lengthy legal sparring and negotiation. Resources committed to settlement negotiation are large and economically inefficient. Even small reduction sinaverage settlement delay stand to affect large reductionsinsocially inefficient spending. Note: Abstract extracted from PDF text
Language
English
Published
University of Virginia, Department of Economics, PHD, 2011
Published Date
2011-12-01
Degree
PHD
Rights
All rights reserved (no additional license for public reuse)
Collection
Libra ETD Repository

Availability

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