Item Details

Hell No! They Won't Go!: Lyndon Johnson and the Nonmobilization of U.S. Army Reserve Forces

Berggren, Kathleen
Format
Thesis/Dissertation; Online
Author
Berggren, Kathleen
Advisor
Hitchcock, William
Abstract
This essay examines the Lyndon Johnson administration's reserve force planning policies from July 1965 through April 1968 asking why the president did not mobilize U.S. Army Reserve Forces for active duty service in Vietnam as most military advisers recommended. I argue that President Johnson repeatedly elected not to call up reserve forces during this period, despite the military’s vehement protestations, because of the perceived domestic political and international ramifications of a mobilization. Whereas mobilization policymaking had traditionally been conceived of as an operational matter that fell under the military’s purview, Johnson and his civilian defense and domestic policy advisers used force planning as a political tool to control public, Congressional, and foreign perceptions of American intentions in ways that previous wartime administrations had not.
Language
English
Date Received
20131121
Published
University of Virginia, Department of History, MA (Master of Arts), 2013
Published Date
2013-04-15
Degree
MA (Master of Arts)
Collection
Libra ETD Repository
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