Item Details

The Theory and Practice of Command and Control in Environmental Policy

edited by Gloria E. Helfand and Peter Berck (University of Michigan, USA and University of California, USA)
Format
EBook; Book; Online
Published
London : Taylor and Francis, 2018.
Edition
First edition
Language
English
ISBN
9781315197296, 9781351769556, 9781138715882, 9781138715905
Summary
"This title was first published in 2003. Economists have had increasing success in arguing the merits of market-based approaches to environmental problems. By making polluting expensive, market-based approaches provide polluters with incentives to clean up, rather than mandates to stop polluting. These approaches include pollution taxes, transferable emissions permits and subsidies for pollution abatement. The purpose of this volume is to explore the situations where Command and Control (CAC) may not be all bad, and in fact might even have some advantages over market-based instruments (MBI)."--Provided by publisher.
Contents
  • Contents: Part I: What is CAC?: Standards versus standards: the effects of different pollution restrictions, Gloria E
  • Helfand
  • Performance versus design standards in the regulation of pollution, David Besanko
  • Agricultural runoff as a nonpoint externality: a theoretical development, Ronald C
  • Griffin and Daniel W
  • Bromley
  • Part II: Sensibly Designed CAC: The new 'Contractarian' paradigm in environmental regulation
  • David A
  • Dana
  • Emission trading vs
  • rigid regulations in the control of vehicle emissions, Catherine L
  • Kling
  • Why CAFE worked, David L
  • Greene
  • Part III: Monitoring Costs: When is command-and-control efficient? Institutions, technology and the comparative efficiency of alternative regulatory regimes for environmental protection
  • Daniel H
  • Cole and Peter Z
  • Grossman
  • The triumph of technology-based standards, Wendy E
  • Wagner
  • The use of economic incentives in developing countries: lessons from international experience with industrial air pollution
  • Allen Blackman and Winston Harrington
  • Environmental policy for developing countries, Ruth Greenspan Bell and Clifford Russell
  • Reevaluating the relationship between transferable property rights and command-and-control regulation, Robert W
  • Hahn and Robert L
  • Axtell
  • Part IV: Non-Uniform Conditions: The Net benefits of incentive-based regulation: a case study of environmental standard setting, Wallace E
  • Oates, Paul R
  • Portney and Albert M
  • McGartland
  • Effluent charges: a critique, Susan Rose-Ackerman
  • Cost-effective policies to improve urban air quality in Santiago, Chile, Ral E
  • O'Ryan
  • Part V: Uncertainty: Prices vs
  • quantities, Martin L
  • Weitzman
  • Ex Post liability for harm vs
  • Ex Ante safety regulation: substitutes or complements?, Charles D
  • Kolstad, Thomas S
  • Ulen and Gary V
  • Johnson
  • Part VI: Imperfect Competition and Information: Regulation of prices and pollution under incomplete information, David P
  • Baron
  • Welfare consequences of emission credit trading programs, David A
  • Malueg
  • Market power and transferable property rights, Robert W
  • Hahn
  • Part VII: Non-Economic Factors: Political Economy and Philosophy: Polluters' profits and political response: direct controls versus taxes, James M
  • Buchanan and Gordon Tullock
  • Polluters' profits and political response: direct control versus taxes: comment, Philip R.P
  • Coelho
  • Polluters' profits and political response: direct control versus taxes: comment, Robert S
  • Main and Charles W
  • Baird
  • Polluters' profits and political response: direct control versus taxes: comment, Gary W
  • Yohe
  • Polluters' profits and political response: direct controls versus taxes: reply, James M
  • A positive theory of environmental quality regulation, Michael T
  • Maloney and Robert E
  • McCormick
  • Economists and the environmental muddle, Steven Kelman
  • Regulation by prices and by command, Amihai Glazer and Charles Lave
  • Explaining market mechanisms, Thomas W
  • Merrill
  • Name index.
Description
1 online resource
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Technical Details
  • Access in Virgo Classic

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    a| Contents: Part I: What is CAC?: Standards versus standards: the effects of different pollution restrictions, Gloria E -- Helfand -- Performance versus design standards in the regulation of pollution, David Besanko -- Agricultural runoff as a nonpoint externality: a theoretical development, Ronald C -- Griffin and Daniel W -- Bromley -- Part II: Sensibly Designed CAC: The new 'Contractarian' paradigm in environmental regulation -- David A -- Dana -- Emission trading vs -- rigid regulations in the control of vehicle emissions, Catherine L -- Kling -- Why CAFE worked, David L -- Greene -- Part III: Monitoring Costs: When is command-and-control efficient? Institutions, technology and the comparative efficiency of alternative regulatory regimes for environmental protection -- Daniel H -- Cole and Peter Z -- Grossman -- The triumph of technology-based standards, Wendy E -- Wagner -- The use of economic incentives in developing countries: lessons from international experience with industrial air pollution -- Allen Blackman and Winston Harrington -- Environmental policy for developing countries, Ruth Greenspan Bell and Clifford Russell -- Reevaluating the relationship between transferable property rights and command-and-control regulation, Robert W -- Hahn and Robert L -- Axtell -- Part IV: Non-Uniform Conditions: The Net benefits of incentive-based regulation: a case study of environmental standard setting, Wallace E -- Oates, Paul R -- Portney and Albert M -- McGartland -- Effluent charges: a critique, Susan Rose-Ackerman -- Cost-effective policies to improve urban air quality in Santiago, Chile, Ral E -- O'Ryan -- Part V: Uncertainty: Prices vs -- quantities, Martin L -- Weitzman -- Ex Post liability for harm vs -- Ex Ante safety regulation: substitutes or complements?, Charles D -- Kolstad, Thomas S -- Ulen and Gary V -- Johnson -- Part VI: Imperfect Competition and Information: Regulation of prices and pollution under incomplete information, David P -- Baron -- Welfare consequences of emission credit trading programs, David A -- Malueg -- Market power and transferable property rights, Robert W -- Hahn -- Part VII: Non-Economic Factors: Political Economy and Philosophy: Polluters' profits and political response: direct controls versus taxes, James M -- Buchanan and Gordon Tullock -- Polluters' profits and political response: direct control versus taxes: comment, Philip R.P -- Coelho -- Polluters' profits and political response: direct control versus taxes: comment, Robert S -- Main and Charles W -- Baird -- Polluters' profits and political response: direct control versus taxes: comment, Gary W -- Yohe -- Polluters' profits and political response: direct controls versus taxes: reply, James M -- Buchanan and Gordon Tullock -- A positive theory of environmental quality regulation, Michael T -- Maloney and Robert E -- McCormick -- Economists and the environmental muddle, Steven Kelman -- Regulation by prices and by command, Amihai Glazer and Charles Lave -- Explaining market mechanisms, Thomas W -- Merrill -- Name index.
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