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Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief

Martin Smith
Format
EBook; Book; Online
Published
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016.
Edition
First edition
Language
English
ISBN
9780191816635
Summary
Martin Smith explores the question of what it takes for a belief to be justified or rational. He argues that in order to have justification for believing a proposition, one's evidence must normically support it-roughly, one's evidence must make the falsity of that proposition abnormal in the sense of calling for special, independent explanation.
Description
1 online resource
Notes
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Copyright Not EvaluatedCopyright Not Evaluated
Technical Details
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    a| Martin Smith explores the question of what it takes for a belief to be justified or rational. He argues that in order to have justification for believing a proposition, one's evidence must normically support it-roughly, one's evidence must make the falsity of that proposition abnormal in the sense of calling for special, independent explanation.
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    a| Certainty.
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