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De Gustibus [electronic resource]: Arguing About Taste and Why We Do It

Peter Kivy
Format
EBook; Book; Online
Published
New York, New York : Oxford University Press 2015.
Edition
First edition
Language
English
ISBN
9780198746782, 0198746784
Summary
In 'De Gustibus' Peter Kivy deals with a question that has never been fully addressed by philosophers of art: why do we argue about art? We argue about the 'facts' of the world either to influence people's behaviour or simply to get them to see what we take to be the truth about the world. We argue over ethical matters, if we are ethical 'realists,' because we think we are arguing about 'facts' in the world. And we argue about ethics, if we are 'emotivists,' or are now what are called 'expressionists,' which is to say, people who think matters of ethics are simply matters of 'attitude,' to influence the behaviour of others. But why should we argue about works of art? There are no 'actions' we wish to motivate. Whether I think Bach is greater than Beethoven and you think the opposite, why should it matter to either of us to convince the other? This is a question that philosophers have never faced. Kivy claims here that we argue over taste because we think, mistakenly or not, that we are arguing over matters of fact.
Contents
  • Hume's Dilemma
  • A Ground Common to All
  • The Beautiful Versus the Good (in the Eighteenth Century)
  • Simple Emotivism
  • Do So as Well
  • The Aesthetic Shrug
  • Immoral Art
  • Is Bad Taste Immoral?
  • Push-Pin and Poetry
  • Back to Square One
  • The Right Phenomenology?
  • The Truth of Interpretation
  • The Truth of Analysis
  • The Truth of Evaluation
  • Common Sense and the Error Theory.
Description
Mode of access: World wide Web.
Notes
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Copyright Not EvaluatedCopyright Not Evaluated
Technical Details
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  • Staff View

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