Item Details

Evidence and Agency [electronic resource]: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving

Berislav Marušić
Format
EBook; Book; Online
Published
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2015.
Language
English
Variant Title
Evidence & agency
ISBN
9780198714040, 0198714041
Summary
Concerned with the question of how, as agents, we should take into account evidence when thinking about our future actions. Sometimes we promise and resolve to do things that we have evidence is difficult for us to do. Should we believe that we will follow through, or believe that there is a good chance that we won't? If we believe the former, we seem to be irrational since we believe against the evidence. yet if we believe the latter, we seem to be insincere since we can't sincerely say that we will follow through. Hence, it seems, our promise or resolution must be improper. To meet this challenge, the author considers and rejects a number of responses, before defending a solution inspired by the Kantian tradition and by Sartre in particular: as agents, we have a distinct view of what we will do. If something is up to us, we can decide what to do, rather than predict what we will do. But the reasons in light of which a decision is rational are not the same as the reasons in light of which a prediction is rational. That is why, provided it is important to us to do something, we can rationally believe that we will do it - even if our belief goes against the evidence.
Contents
  • Acknowledgments. Introduction. 1 Promising and resolving against the evidence : Clarifying the problems
  • The appeal to trying
  • An explanatory task: asymmetries between agents, lovers, and observers
  • Outlook
  • Conclusion. 2 Sincerity and rationality : Sincerity
  • Rationality
  • Propriety
  • Belief
  • Conclusion. 3 The non-cognitivist response : Intending
  • Aiming
  • Accepting
  • The combined non-cognitivist response
  • Conclusion. 4 The practical knowledge response : Practical knowledge
  • Against the practical knowledge response
  • Against the practical knowledge approach
  • Conclusion: practical thought. 5 The evidentialist response : The evidentialist's bridge principles
  • A disheartening view
  • Epistemic evasion
  • Conclusion. 6 The Sartrean response : The agent's point of view
  • Why belief?
  • Case studies
  • Objections and replies : Belief aims at knowledge
  • Coordination without reconciliation
  • Foregoing self-knowledge
  • A comeback for the practical knowledge response?
  • The idea of freedom
  • Predictive promises
  • Pragmatic encroachment
  • Betting
  • The difference between promising and resolving
  • Freedom
  • Anguish
  • Conclusion. 7 Trusting against the evidence : The evidentialist response
  • The calculating response
  • The testimonial knowledge response
  • The strawsonian response
  • Conclusion. Conclusion. Postscript. Glossary. References. Index.
Description
Mode of access: World wide Web.
Notes
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Logo for Copyright Not EvaluatedCopyright Not Evaluated
Technical Details

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    a| Acknowledgments. Introduction. 1 Promising and resolving against the evidence : Clarifying the problems -- The appeal to trying -- An explanatory task: asymmetries between agents, lovers, and observers -- Outlook -- Conclusion. 2 Sincerity and rationality : Sincerity -- Rationality -- Propriety -- Belief -- Conclusion. 3 The non-cognitivist response : Intending -- Aiming -- Accepting -- The combined non-cognitivist response -- Conclusion. 4 The practical knowledge response : Practical knowledge -- Against the practical knowledge response -- Against the practical knowledge approach -- Conclusion: practical thought. 5 The evidentialist response : The evidentialist's bridge principles -- A disheartening view -- Epistemic evasion -- Conclusion. 6 The Sartrean response : The agent's point of view -- Why belief? -- Case studies -- Objections and replies : Belief aims at knowledge -- Coordination without reconciliation -- Foregoing self-knowledge -- A comeback for the practical knowledge response? -- The idea of freedom -- Predictive promises -- Pragmatic encroachment -- Betting -- The difference between promising and resolving -- Freedom -- Anguish -- Conclusion. 7 Trusting against the evidence : The evidentialist response -- The calculating response -- The testimonial knowledge response -- The strawsonian response -- Why belief? -- Conclusion. Conclusion. Postscript. Glossary. References. Index.
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    a| Concerned with the question of how, as agents, we should take into account evidence when thinking about our future actions. Sometimes we promise and resolve to do things that we have evidence is difficult for us to do. Should we believe that we will follow through, or believe that there is a good chance that we won't? If we believe the former, we seem to be irrational since we believe against the evidence. yet if we believe the latter, we seem to be insincere since we can't sincerely say that we will follow through. Hence, it seems, our promise or resolution must be improper. To meet this challenge, the author considers and rejects a number of responses, before defending a solution inspired by the Kantian tradition and by Sartre in particular: as agents, we have a distinct view of what we will do. If something is up to us, we can decide what to do, rather than predict what we will do. But the reasons in light of which a decision is rational are not the same as the reasons in light of which a prediction is rational. That is why, provided it is important to us to do something, we can rationally believe that we will do it - even if our belief goes against the evidence.
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