Item Details

Print View

The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence

James Raymond Vreeland (Georgetown University), Axel Dreher (Heidelberg University)
Format
Book
Published
New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Language
English
ISBN
9780521518413 (hbk.), 0521518415 (hbk.), 9780521740067 (pbk.), 0521740061 (pbk.)
Summary
"Trades of money for political influence persist at every level of government. Not surprisingly, governments themselves trade money for political support on the international stage. Strange, however, is the tale of this book. For, in this study, legitimacy stands as the central political commodity at stake. The book investigates the ways governments trade money for favors at the United Nations Security Council - the body endowed with the international legal authority to legitimize the use of armed force to maintain or restore peace. With a wealth of quantitative data, the book shows that powerful countries, such as the United States, Japan, and Germany, extend financial favors to the elected members of the Security Council through direct foreign aid and through international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In return, developing countries serving on the Security Council must deliver their political support... or face the consequences"--
Contents
  • Money and politics on the international stage
  • A theory of Trading Security Council votes for aid
  • Examples of punishments, threats, and rewards
  • Who wins election to represent the world?
  • Statistical evidence of trading finance for favors
  • Consequences of politically motivated foreign aid
  • Reforming the UNSC.
Description
xix, 291 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
Notes
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Technical Details
  • Access in Virgo Classic
  • Staff View

    LEADER 03115cam a2200541 i 4500
    001 u6443863
    003 SIRSI
    005 20141226084608.0
    008 140116t20142014nyua b 001 0 eng
    010
      
      
    a| 2013043783
    015
      
      
    a| GBB428405 2| bnb
    016
    7
      
    a| 016649311 2| Uk
    019
      
      
    a| 881436156
    020
      
      
    a| 9780521518413 (hbk.)
    020
      
      
    a| 0521518415 (hbk.)
    020
      
      
    a| 9780521740067 (pbk.)
    020
      
      
    a| 0521740061 (pbk.)
    024
    8
      
    a| 40023929808
    029
    1
      
    a| AU@ b| 000052531323
    029
    1
      
    a| NZ1 b| 15630699
    035
      
      
    a| (Sirsi) o870335268
    035
      
      
    a| (OCoLC)870335268 z| (OCoLC)881436156
    040
      
      
    a| DLC e| rda b| eng c| DLC d| YDX d| BTCTA d| YDXCP d| OCLCO d| UKMGB d| RCJ d| OCLCF d| YUS d| HEBIS d| CDX
    042
      
      
    a| pcc
    050
    0
    0
    a| JZ5006.7 b| .V74 2014
    082
    0
    0
    a| 341.23/23 2| 23
    084
      
      
    a| POL011000 2| bisacsh
    100
    1
      
    a| Vreeland, James Raymond, d| 1971- e| author.
    245
    1
    4
    a| The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council : b| money and influence / c| James Raymond Vreeland (Georgetown University), Axel Dreher (Heidelberg University).
    264
      
    1
    a| New York, NY : b| Cambridge University Press, c| 2014.
    264
      
    4
    c| ©2014
    300
      
      
    a| xix, 291 pages : b| illustrations ; c| 24 cm
    336
      
      
    a| text 2| rdacontent
    337
      
      
    a| unmediated 2| rdamedia
    338
      
      
    a| volume 2| rdacarrier
    504
      
      
    a| Includes bibliographical references and index.
    505
    0
    0
    t| Money and politics on the international stage -- t| A theory of Trading Security Council votes for aid -- t| Examples of punishments, threats, and rewards -- t| Who wins election to represent the world? -- t| Statistical evidence of trading finance for favors -- t| Consequences of politically motivated foreign aid -- t| Reforming the UNSC.
    520
      
      
    a| "Trades of money for political influence persist at every level of government. Not surprisingly, governments themselves trade money for political support on the international stage. Strange, however, is the tale of this book. For, in this study, legitimacy stands as the central political commodity at stake. The book investigates the ways governments trade money for favors at the United Nations Security Council - the body endowed with the international legal authority to legitimize the use of armed force to maintain or restore peace. With a wealth of quantitative data, the book shows that powerful countries, such as the United States, Japan, and Germany, extend financial favors to the elected members of the Security Council through direct foreign aid and through international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In return, developing countries serving on the Security Council must deliver their political support... or face the consequences"-- c| Provided by publisher.
    610
    2
    0
    a| United Nations. b| Security Council x| Economic aspects.
    700
    1
      
    a| Dreher, Axel, e| author.
    596
      
      
    a| 2
    999
      
      
    a| JZ5006.7 .V74 2014 w| LC i| X031704558 l| STACKS m| ALDERMAN t| BOOK
▾See more
▴See less

Availability

Google Preview

Google Books Preview
Library Location Map Availability Call Number
Alderman Stacks Map Available