Item Details

Theory of Knowledge

Keith Lehrer
Format
Book
Published
Boulder : Westview Press, 2000.
Edition
2nd ed
Language
English
Series
Dimensions of Philosophy Series
ISBN
0813390532 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Contents
  • 1 Analysis of Knowledge 1
  • Form and Objectives of an Analysis of Knowledge 8
  • Analysis of Knowledge 11
  • Theories of Justification 15
  • A Counterexample 18
  • Justification Without Falsity: A Fourth Condition 20
  • A Final Analysis of Knowledge 20
  • 2 Truth and Acceptance 25
  • Acceptance and Knowledge 32
  • Consistency of Knowledge and Belief 32
  • Borderline Cases of Knowledge 36
  • Memory Without Knowledge 42
  • 3 Foundation Theory: Infallible Foundationalism 45
  • Infallible Versus Fallible Foundationalism 46
  • Fallible Foundations 46
  • Foundation Theory in General 48
  • Foundation As a Guarantee of Truth 49
  • Incorrigible Foundations 50
  • Fallibility and Inference: Summary of the Argument 58
  • Nomological Infallibility 59
  • Meaning and Belief 59
  • Opacity of Incorrigibility 61
  • Justification As a Logical Guarantee of Truth for Nonbasic Beliefs 63
  • Phenomenalism 63
  • Objections to Phenomenalism 65
  • 4 Fallible Foundations 71
  • Perceptual Belief and Independent Information 72
  • Justification and Innocent Belief 73
  • Semantics and Justification 76
  • Self-Justification and Necessary Truth 79
  • Semantic Foundationalism: A Counterexample 80
  • Contingent Self-Justification 83
  • Probability and Justification: Fallibilistic Foundationalism 85
  • Three Concepts of Probability 86
  • Probability, Truth, and Basic Belief 93
  • Summary: Competence, Success, and Coherence 94
  • 5 Explanatory Coherence Theory 97
  • Regress, or the Circle 97
  • Traditional Answer: Coherence As Implication 100
  • Coherence As Explanation 101
  • On the Justification of What Is Explained 102
  • Explanatory Coherence and Justification: An Analysis 103
  • Objections and Replies to Coherence As Explanation 108
  • Self-Explanatory Beliefs 112
  • Simplicity and Conservation 118
  • 6 Internal Coherence and Personal Justification 123
  • Acceptance and Belief Reconsidered 124
  • Justification and Reasonable Acceptance 125
  • Justification, Reasonableness, and Coherence 126
  • Suggestion of a Unified Theory of Knowledge 128
  • Objection Defined 130
  • Justification Game: Replying to a Critic 132
  • Answering Objections 134
  • Justification Game and the Definition of Personal Justification 136
  • A Foundationalist Objection 137
  • Principle of Trustworthiness of Acceptance 138
  • Virtuous Loop of Reason 142
  • Lottery Paradox 146
  • Advantages of Truth 147
  • 7 Coherence, Truth, and Undefeated Justification 151
  • Uncharitable Possibility of Error 151
  • Undefeated Justification 153
  • A Solution: Defeat and the Ultra Justification Game 160
  • Truth Connection and the Isolation Objection 163
  • Perception, Memory, and Introspection 165
  • Knowledge of the Eliminated 166
  • A Definition of Undefeated Justification 168
  • Knowledge Reduced to Undefeated Justification 169
  • Determining Justification 173
  • 8 Externalism and the Truth Connection 177
  • Naturalism 178
  • Advantages of Externalism 179
  • Naturalistic Relation 182
  • Objections to Externalism: Information Without Knowledge and the Opacity Objection 185
  • Externalism and Justification 189
  • Undefeated Justification and Reliabilism 191
  • Trustworthiness and Reliability in the Justification Game 193
  • Conversion to Irrefutable Justification 194
  • Causation and Justification: The Basing Relation 195
  • Acceptance, Belief, and Justification 198
  • Reliability and the Justification Game 198
  • Trustworthiness and Prejudice: An Objection 200
  • Externalism, Foundationalism, and Coherence: An Ecumenical Reconsideration 201
  • 9 Skepticism, Virtue, and Context 205
  • Skepticism and Agnoiology 205
  • Conception and the Chance of Error 206
  • An Answer to Skepticism: Fallibility, Not Ignorance 208
  • Intellectual Virtue and Trustworthiness 209
  • Duplication Argument: An Objection 212
  • Merits ofs Skepticism 213
  • Skepticism and Closure: An Externalist Caveat 214
  • Trilemma of Knowledge and Skepticism 216
  • Contextualism: Another Solution 218
  • Why not Closure? 220
  • Contextualism and Trustworthiness 222
  • Insufficiency of Reliability and the Role of Explanation 223
  • Answering the Skeptic: A Concluding Discourse 224
  • Acceptance and Self-Trust: A Reply to the Skeptic 225
  • Virtuous Loop Maximizes Explanation 228.
Description
xv, 250 p. ; 23 cm.
Notes
Includes bibliographical references (p. 233-242) and index.
Technical Details
  • Access in Virgo Classic

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    g| 1 t| Analysis of Knowledge g| 1 -- t| Form and Objectives of an Analysis of Knowledge g| 8 -- t| Analysis of Knowledge g| 11 -- t| Theories of Justification g| 15 -- t| A Counterexample g| 18 -- t| Justification Without Falsity: A Fourth Condition g| 20 -- t| A Final Analysis of Knowledge g| 20 -- g| 2 t| Truth and Acceptance g| 25 -- t| Acceptance and Knowledge g| 32 -- t| Consistency of Knowledge and Belief g| 32 -- t| Borderline Cases of Knowledge g| 36 -- t| Memory Without Knowledge g| 42 -- g| 3 t| Foundation Theory: Infallible Foundationalism g| 45 -- t| Infallible Versus Fallible Foundationalism g| 46 -- t| Fallible Foundations g| 46 -- t| Foundation Theory in General g| 48 -- t| Foundation As a Guarantee of Truth g| 49 -- t| Incorrigible Foundations g| 50 -- t| Fallibility and Inference: Summary of the Argument g| 58 -- t| Nomological Infallibility g| 59 -- t| Meaning and Belief g| 59 -- t| Opacity of Incorrigibility g| 61 -- t| Justification As a Logical Guarantee of Truth for Nonbasic Beliefs g| 63 -- t| Phenomenalism g| 63 -- t| Objections to Phenomenalism g| 65 -- g| 4 t| Fallible Foundations g| 71 -- t| Perceptual Belief and Independent Information g| 72 -- t| Justification and Innocent Belief g| 73 -- t| Semantics and Justification g| 76 -- t| Self-Justification and Necessary Truth g| 79 -- t| Semantic Foundationalism: A Counterexample g| 80 -- t| Contingent Self-Justification g| 83 -- t| Probability and Justification: Fallibilistic Foundationalism g| 85 -- t| Three Concepts of Probability g| 86 -- t| Probability, Truth, and Basic Belief g| 93 -- t| Summary: Competence, Success, and Coherence g| 94 -- g| 5 t| Explanatory Coherence Theory g| 97 -- t| Regress, or the Circle g| 97 -- t| Traditional Answer: Coherence As Implication g| 100 -- t| Coherence As Explanation g| 101 -- t| On the Justification of What Is Explained g| 102 -- t| Explanatory Coherence and Justification: An Analysis g| 103 -- t| Objections and Replies to Coherence As Explanation g| 108 -- t| Self-Explanatory Beliefs g| 112 -- t| Simplicity and Conservation g| 118 -- g| 6 t| Internal Coherence and Personal Justification g| 123 -- t| Acceptance and Belief Reconsidered g| 124 -- t| Justification and Reasonable Acceptance g| 125 -- t| Justification, Reasonableness, and Coherence g| 126 -- t| Suggestion of a Unified Theory of Knowledge g| 128 -- t| Objection Defined g| 130 -- t| Justification Game: Replying to a Critic g| 132 -- t| Answering Objections g| 134 -- t| Justification Game and the Definition of Personal Justification g| 136 -- t| A Foundationalist Objection g| 137 -- t| Principle of Trustworthiness of Acceptance g| 138 -- t| Virtuous Loop of Reason g| 142 -- t| Lottery Paradox g| 146 -- t| Advantages of Truth g| 147 -- g| 7 t| Coherence, Truth, and Undefeated Justification g| 151 -- t| Uncharitable Possibility of Error g| 151 -- t| Undefeated Justification g| 153 -- t| A Solution: Defeat and the Ultra Justification Game g| 160 -- t| Truth Connection and the Isolation Objection g| 163 -- t| Perception, Memory, and Introspection g| 165 -- t| Knowledge of the Eliminated g| 166 -- t| A Definition of Undefeated Justification g| 168 -- t| Knowledge Reduced to Undefeated Justification g| 169 -- t| Determining Justification g| 173 -- g| 8 t| Externalism and the Truth Connection g| 177 -- t| Naturalism g| 178 -- t| Advantages of Externalism g| 179 -- t| Naturalistic Relation g| 182 -- t| Objections to Externalism: Information Without Knowledge and the Opacity Objection g| 185 -- t| Externalism and Justification g| 189 -- t| Undefeated Justification and Reliabilism g| 191 -- t| Trustworthiness and Reliability in the Justification Game g| 193 -- t| Conversion to Irrefutable Justification g| 194 -- t| Causation and Justification: The Basing Relation g| 195 -- t| Acceptance, Belief, and Justification g| 198 -- t| Reliability and the Justification Game g| 198 -- t| Trustworthiness and Prejudice: An Objection g| 200 -- t| Externalism, Foundationalism, and Coherence: An Ecumenical Reconsideration g| 201 -- g| 9 t| Skepticism, Virtue, and Context g| 205 -- t| Skepticism and Agnoiology g| 205 -- t| Conception and the Chance of Error g| 206 -- t| An Answer to Skepticism: Fallibility, Not Ignorance g| 208 -- t| Intellectual Virtue and Trustworthiness g| 209 -- t| Duplication Argument: An Objection g| 212 -- t| Merits ofs Skepticism g| 213 -- t| Skepticism and Closure: An Externalist Caveat g| 214 -- t| Trilemma of Knowledge and Skepticism g| 216 -- t| Contextualism: Another Solution g| 218 -- t| Why not Closure? g| 220 -- t| Contextualism and Trustworthiness g| 222 -- t| Insufficiency of Reliability and the Role of Explanation g| 223 -- t| Answering the Skeptic: A Concluding Discourse g| 224 -- t| Acceptance and Self-Trust: A Reply to the Skeptic g| 225 -- t| Virtuous Loop Maximizes Explanation g| 228.
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