Item Details

The Explanationist Defense of Scientific Reason

Dorit A. Ganson
Format
Book
Published
New York : Garland Pub., 2001.
Language
English
Series
Studies in Philosophy
Studies in Philosophy (New York, N.Y.)
ISBN
081533964X (alk. paper)
Contents
  • I. Explanationism 1
  • I.i Debate About Realism and the Constraints of Rationality 1
  • I.ii Versions of Explanationism/Realism 5
  • I.iii Externalist vs. Internalist Explanationist Approaches to Defending Realism 11
  • II. Miller's Internalist Explanationism 14
  • II.i Introducing Topic-Specific Truisms 14
  • II.ii A Brief Overview of Miller on Cause, Explanation, and Confirmation 16
  • II.iii Role of Truisms in the Explanationist Defense of Realism 21
  • II.iv Why Truisms are Independent Marks of Rationality 23
  • II.v Unfinished Business in Miller's Program 29
  • Chapter 2 Acausal Models of Explanation 35
  • I. Introduction: The Threat Acausalist Models of Explanation Pose to Contemporary Explanationism 35
  • II. A Brief History of Acausal Models of Explanation 38
  • II.i Hume's Legacy and the Deductive-Nomological Model 38
  • II.ii From the Inductive-Statistical Model to the Statistical Relevance Approach 41
  • III. Statistical Relevance Model of Explanation 46
  • III.i An Outline of the Model and Some Refinements 46x
  • III.ii Requirement of Objective Homogeneity 50
  • III.iii Salmon's Acausal Criteria for Admissible Selection Rules and Ensuing Problems 53
  • III.iv Difficulties in the Identification of Causal Relevance With Statistical Relevance 60
  • Chapter 3 Van Fraassen's Arguments against Inference to the Best Explanation 67
  • I. Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism 67
  • II. Building a Case Against Explanationism: The Short Arguments 71
  • II.i Scientific Image 71
  • II.ii Laws and Symmetry 77
  • III. Bayesian Peter Objection 82
  • III.i Van Fraassen's Dutch Book Argument 82
  • III.ii Flaws in the Argument 87
  • III.iii Reconciling Explanationism with Bayes' Theorem 92
  • Chapter 4 Van Fraassen's Dutch Books 95
  • I. A Philosophical Application of the Probability Calculus: Using Dutch Book Arguments to Derive Rationality Constraints 96
  • II. Principle of Reflection 103
  • III. Temporally Extended Principle of Reflection 110
  • IV. A Prohibition Against Assigning a Probability Value to some Special Conditional Propositions 116
  • Chapter 5 Varieties of Explanationism and Fine's Critique 125
  • I. Smart's "Wouldn't It be a Miracle?" Argument 128
  • II. Boyd's Arguments for Realism 133
  • II.i Boyd's Inference to the Best Explanation 133
  • II.ii Rival Explanans and Explanandum 137
  • II.iii Circularity Objection and the Realist Package 146
  • III. Naturalized vs. Non-naturalized Realism 155
  • Chapter 6 Transcendental Road to Realism 161
  • I. Fine's Criticisms of Miller's Realism 163
  • II. True Source of Unreasonable Doubt 165
  • III. Why Taking on Isn't Good Enough 176
  • IV. Salvaging Realism about Molecules 184
  • I. Realist Account of Broad Empirical Scope (and its Bayesian Justification) 193
  • II. Van Fraassen's UnBayesian Rejection of Broad Scope as an Epistemically Relevant Virtue 197.
Description
xiv, 206 p. ; 24 cm.
Notes
Includes bibliographical references (p. [201]-203) and index.
Technical Details
  • Access in Virgo Classic

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    g| I. t| Explanationism g| 1 -- g| I.i t| Debate About Realism and the Constraints of Rationality g| 1 -- g| I.ii t| Versions of Explanationism/Realism g| 5 -- g| I.iii t| Externalist vs. Internalist Explanationist Approaches to Defending Realism g| 11 -- g| II. t| Miller's Internalist Explanationism g| 14 -- g| II.i t| Introducing Topic-Specific Truisms g| 14 -- g| II.ii t| A Brief Overview of Miller on Cause, Explanation, and Confirmation g| 16 -- g| II.iii t| Role of Truisms in the Explanationist Defense of Realism g| 21 -- g| II.iv t| Why Truisms are Independent Marks of Rationality g| 23 -- g| II.v t| Unfinished Business in Miller's Program g| 29 -- g| Chapter 2 t| Acausal Models of Explanation g| 35 -- g| I. t| Introduction: The Threat Acausalist Models of Explanation Pose to Contemporary Explanationism g| 35 -- g| II. t| A Brief History of Acausal Models of Explanation g| 38 -- g| II.i t| Hume's Legacy and the Deductive-Nomological Model g| 38 -- g| II.ii t| From the Inductive-Statistical Model to the Statistical Relevance Approach g| 41 -- g| III. t| Statistical Relevance Model of Explanation g| 46 -- g| III.i t| An Outline of the Model and Some Refinements g| 46x -- g| III.ii t| Requirement of Objective Homogeneity g| 50 -- g| III.iii t| Salmon's Acausal Criteria for Admissible Selection Rules and Ensuing Problems g| 53 -- g| III.iv t| Difficulties in the Identification of Causal Relevance With Statistical Relevance g| 60 -- g| Chapter 3 t| Van Fraassen's Arguments against Inference to the Best Explanation g| 67 -- g| I. t| Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism g| 67 -- g| II. t| Building a Case Against Explanationism: The Short Arguments g| 71 -- g| II.i t| Scientific Image g| 71 -- g| II.ii t| Laws and Symmetry g| 77 -- g| III. t| Bayesian Peter Objection g| 82 -- g| III.i t| Van Fraassen's Dutch Book Argument g| 82 -- g| III.ii t| Flaws in the Argument g| 87 -- g| III.iii t| Reconciling Explanationism with Bayes' Theorem g| 92 -- g| Chapter 4 t| Van Fraassen's Dutch Books g| 95 -- g| I. t| A Philosophical Application of the Probability Calculus: Using Dutch Book Arguments to Derive Rationality Constraints g| 96 -- g| II. t| Principle of Reflection g| 103 -- g| III. t| Temporally Extended Principle of Reflection g| 110 -- g| IV. t| A Prohibition Against Assigning a Probability Value to some Special Conditional Propositions g| 116 -- g| Chapter 5 t| Varieties of Explanationism and Fine's Critique g| 125 -- g| I. t| Smart's "Wouldn't It be a Miracle?" Argument g| 128 -- g| II. t| Boyd's Arguments for Realism g| 133 -- g| II.i t| Boyd's Inference to the Best Explanation g| 133 -- g| II.ii t| Rival Explanans and Explanandum g| 137 -- g| II.iii t| Circularity Objection and the Realist Package g| 146 -- g| III. t| Naturalized vs. Non-naturalized Realism g| 155 -- g| Chapter 6 t| Transcendental Road to Realism g| 161 -- g| I. t| Fine's Criticisms of Miller's Realism g| 163 -- g| II. t| True Source of Unreasonable Doubt g| 165 -- g| III. t| Why Taking on Isn't Good Enough g| 176 -- g| IV. t| Salvaging Realism about Molecules g| 184 -- g| I. t| Realist Account of Broad Empirical Scope (and its Bayesian Justification) g| 193 -- g| II. t| Van Fraassen's UnBayesian Rejection of Broad Scope as an Epistemically Relevant Virtue g| 197.
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