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Democracies Under Fire: How Democratic Targets and Allies Respond to Coercive Threats

Scroggs, Matt
Format
Thesis/Dissertation; Online
Author
Scroggs, Matt
Advisor
Owen, John
Potter, Philip
Sechser, Todd
Copeland, Dale
Stam, Allan
Abstract
When do states concede to coercive threats? While the majority of research has focused on the states initiating these challenges, comparatively little attention has been given to the targets, the states that actually face the choice of whether to stand firm or back down. My project examines the role that a target's regime-type, broadly construed as democratic versus non-democratic states, plays in the decision-making process, arguing that democracies are more likely to concede when threatened due to the higher costs they pay for foreign policy failure and the relative ease that challengers have in identifying whether democracies are vulnerable to coercion. Further, my argument also extends to the role of democratic allies, who are less reliable when threats of violence are employed against their protégés. I employ statistical evidence with data from the Militarized Compellent Threat (MCT) and Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) datasets to show the broad validity of my claims, as well as in-depth case studies, namely the Munich and Suez Crises, to demonstrate how my theory works in practice.
Language
English
Published
University of Virginia, Department of Politics, PHD (Doctor of Philosophy), 2017
Published Date
2017-04-28
Degree
PHD (Doctor of Philosophy)
Rights
All rights reserved (no additional license for public reuse)
Collection
Libra ETD Repository

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