Item Details

Replication Data for: The Illusion of Democratic Credibility

Alexander B. Downes; Todd S. Sechser
Format
Computer Resource; Online; Dataset
Author
Alexander B. Downes
Todd S. Sechser
Abstract
Do democracies make more effective coercive threats? An influential literature in international relations argues that democratic institutions allow leaders to credibly signal their resolve in crises, thereby making their threats more likely to work than threats by nondemocracies. This article revisits the quantitative evidence for this proposition, which we call the "democratic credibility hypothesis," and finds that it is surprisingly weak. Close examination of the datasets most commonly used to test this hypothesis reveals that they contain few successful democratic threats, or indeed threats of any kind. Moreover, these datasets' outcome variables do not properly measure the effectiveness of threats, and therefore yield misleading results. The article then reassesses the democratic credibility hypothesis using the Militarized Compellent Threats dataset, a new dataset designed specifically to test hypotheses about the effectiveness of coercive threats. The analysis indicates that threats from democracies are no more successful than threats from other states.
Date Received
20161104
Published
University of Virginia, 2012
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