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Effectiveness of Safety Regulations [electronic resource]: A Study of U. S. Coast Guard Inspections, Detection of Violations, and Occurrence of Casualties

Kishore Gawande, Alok Bohara
Format
Computer Resource; Online
Published
Ann Arbor, Mich. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor] 2013
Edition
2013-06-06
Series
ICPSR
ICPSR (Series)
Access Restriction
AVAILABLE. This study is freely available to the general public.
Abstract

This study addresses two issues in the enforcement of public law. The first is whether the system of inspections and penalties set by the regulator is effective. The second is whether a better system of inspections and penalties can be designed, given the institutional constraints under which the regulator must function. We study these issues in the context of oil spill prevention activities of the United States Coast Guard (USCG), the agency entrusted with the enforcement of maritime pollution laws. A theoretically optimal contract that mixes penalties based on the amount of pollution ex post with penalties based on the extent of noncompliance ex ante is derived. The effectiveness of USCG inspections and penalties in reducing oil spills is then econometrically studied using microlevel data on a panel of United States flag tank vessels. Whether the optimal penalty can potentially improve the effectiveness of compliance inspections in reducing oil spills is examined in the light of the empirical results and recent developments in the economics and public management literature on effective incentive contracting. Among our findings is the potential for combining unilateral incentive-based methods with cooperative methods based on reciprocity to solve the complex problem of law enforcement.

Cf: http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34624.v1
Contents
Dataset
Description
Mode of access: Intranet.
Notes
Title from ICPSR DDI metadata of 2016-02-11.
Series Statement
ICPSR 34624
ICPSR (Series) 34624
Other Forms
Also available as downloadable files.
Copyright Not EvaluatedCopyright Not Evaluated
Technical Details
  • Staff View

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