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Membership Structure and Occupational Credit Union Deposit Rates [electronic resource]

William R. Emmons, Frank Schmid
Format
Computer Resource; Online
Published
Ann Arbor, Mich. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor] 2001
Edition
2001-06-12
Series
ICPSR
ICPSR (Series)
Access Restriction
AVAILABLE. This study is freely available to the general public.
Abstract
How do occupational credit unions set deposit rates? This article shows that the answer to this question depends on who actually makes business decisions in credit unions (who is in control), and whether local deposit market competition is important. It is not obvious who controls occupational credit unions. If the sponsor (the employer) is in control, then loans and deposits are priced to maximize the surplus received by all of the credit union's current and potential members (those eligible to join). If members are in control, then a group of members with a majority can maximize its own surplus. The group in control may include members whose primary purpose for joining the credit union is to borrow money or, alternatively, to lend money (make deposits). If local deposit-market competition is the dominant influence, then internal characteristics of the credit union won't matter at all. This study tests the sponsor-control, the member-control, and the market-control hypotheses against each other using a large sample of occupational credit unions observed in 1997. The results suggest that sponsors exercise effective control over occupational credit unions.Cf: http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR01237.v1
Contents
Dataset
Description
Mode of access: Intranet.
Notes
Title from ICPSR DDI metadata of 2016-02-11.
Series Statement
ICPSR 1237
ICPSR (Series) 1237
Other Forms
Also available as downloadable files.
Copyright Not EvaluatedCopyright Not Evaluated
Technical Details
  • Staff View

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    a| How do occupational credit unions set deposit rates? This article shows that the answer to this question depends on who actually makes business decisions in credit unions (who is in control), and whether local deposit market competition is important. It is not obvious who controls occupational credit unions. If the sponsor (the employer) is in control, then loans and deposits are priced to maximize the surplus received by all of the credit union's current and potential members (those eligible to join). If members are in control, then a group of members with a majority can maximize its own surplus. The group in control may include members whose primary purpose for joining the credit union is to borrow money or, alternatively, to lend money (make deposits). If local deposit-market competition is the dominant influence, then internal characteristics of the credit union won't matter at all. This study tests the sponsor-control, the member-control, and the market-control hypotheses against each other using a large sample of occupational credit unions observed in 1997. The results suggest that sponsors exercise effective control over occupational credit unions.Cf: http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR01237.v1
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